Pillar: Financial Markets

How green bonds can fund development

Opinion article originally published on Devex.

One of climate change’s great injustices is that the worst affected countries are the ones that have contributed least to the problem.

In 2015, the world coalesced behind the Paris Agreement on climate change in an effort to transition to a low carbon future. And while much attention has been on the United States’ decision to withdraw from the agreement, many African governments have been stepping up.

Following the African Union’s lead, GhanaEthiopia, and Kenya, among others, have all factored climate change into their national development plans. And it is easy to see why these African nations are approaching climate change with earnest given the danger climate change presents to the continent. Cyclone Idai, for example, left incalculable destruction across three countries last month, an unfortunate reminder of the devastation climate change could have on the continent.

Trillions of dollars of investment are needed to combat climate change. And while the Paris Agreement does have funding mechanisms to support developing countries, these funds can only go so far.

Moreover, unlike the world’s primary greenhouse gas emitters, developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa need to encourage growth without fueling emissions.

Take electricity: Sustainable Development Goal 7 states that everyone should have access to affordable and reliable electricity by 2030. Yet, in a region where more than half the population still does not have access, governments need to improve access and reliability without turning to high-emitting power sources such as coal.

The role of green bonds

A solution to the crisis may lie in green bonds, which allow issuers to raise money specifically for environmentally friendly projects, such as renewable energy or clean transport.

This year, analysts predict the green bonds market will grow to $200 billion, a 20% increase from last year and a significant jump from 2016, which saw $87 billion raised. But while the global market continues to grow, there are fewer bonds available across Africa.

Most of Africa’s green bonds have been issued by the African Development Bank, which has raised over $1.5 billion since 2013. While Nigeria issued a $29.7 million bond to fund solar energy and forestry projects in December 2017, no other countries have followed suit.

African governments have historically relied on development finance institutions to fund green projects such as irrigation initiatives and solar energy. However, this is unsustainable and ignores potential capital that could be raised from pension funds, the diaspora, and the middle class. For example, Kenya’s pension sector is valued at about 1.2 trillion Kenyan shilling, or $11.9 billion.

If national governments want to unlock more capital, structures are needed to give investors the confidence to invest.

Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa are leading the charge in sub-Saharan Africa. Since 2017, these countries have been working with a range of partners, including FSD Africa, to develop a robust framework for the issuance and listing of green bonds. Now, Nigeria and Kenya have joined India, China, and Indonesia in turning their frameworks into official guidelines — and the market is responding.

Last month, the Nigerian-based Access Bank issued Africa’s first certified corporate green bond, unlocking $41 million to protect Eko Atlantic City, near Lagos, from rising sea levels. This bond will also support a solar energy project. Notably, the bond was fully subscribed, highlighting the fact that if the frameworks are built, investors will come.

While development finance will always play a critical role in supporting development on the continent, countries are recognizing they need to unlock funding from other areas. Kenya and Nigeria have heard this call and global markets have responded. This should give other countries confidence to follow suit.

Given the nascent nature of capital markets in Africa, we have the unique opportunity to build them from the ground up and respond to pressing priorities including climate finance. This is particularly critical as governments start to pursue infrastructure development at a larger scale.

Green bonds may still be a small piece of the global bond market, but they are showing real potential for helping developing countries move to greener, more equal economies.

What’s next for green bonds in Africa

The Green Bonds Listing Rules and Guidelines for Kenya were issued last week. These make it clear to issuers of Green Bonds in Kenya what the regulators expect of them by way of disclosure. Regulatory certainty is the bedrock of well-functioning financial markets and so the launch is an important milestone in the development of this fast-growing market.

The Kenya Green Bond Programme, co-funded by FSD Africa, has already identified KSh90bn of investment opportunity in Green Bonds in the manufacturing, transport and agriculture sectors in Kenya, a small but significant contribution to a global market that is already worth almost $400bn.  The Kenyan government itself is planning to issue its first Green Sovereign Bond, perhaps in the next six months.

The Patron of the Kenya Green Bond Programme, Central Bank Governor Patrick Njoroge, a passionate environmentalist, spoke eloquently at the launch about the societal value of investing through Green Bonds.

The elephant in the room was the interest rate cap in nya. While caps remain in place, the pricing for Green Bonds, as for other non-sovereign bonds, will almost certainly be prohibitively expensive compared to long-term bank finance.  We run the risk that the momentum that now exists in Kenya for Green Bonds will stall because of this almost existential problem. The Governor urged us to take a long view – implying the caps will one day be lifted.  We live in hope but it is a pity that priority sectors for Kenya’s economic development, such as affordable housing and manufacturing, cannot at the moment easily benefit from investor interest in this asset class.

Already Nigeria, which issued a Green Sovereign in December 2017, is pulling ahead of Kenya and the Nigerian corporate sector seems to be gripping the Green Bond opportunity more vigorously than Kenya with several issues at an advanced stage, including in the commercial banking sector.  FSD Africa has an active Green Bond programme in Nigeria too.

Another problem is easy access to competitively-t from Development Finance Institutions. On the one hand, DFIs push environmental priorities through ESG frameworks. On the other, they offer credit lines to potential issuers on significantly more attractive terms than bond pricing.  Does that matter – if green projects get funded anyway?  Well, yes it does, if it means we keep not seeing demonstration transactions for Green Bonds. The potential supply of finance for Green Bonds from local pension funds and other institutions is so much greater than what DFIs will ever be able to make available – we should take what opportunities there are to get local institutional capital into this market and DFIs should step back.

A big part of the attraction with Green Bonds is the extra corporate disclosure that is required. Companies are required to lay out their environmental strategy for the Green Bond they want to issue and what systems they will put in place to make sure the bonds proceeds are allocated for the stated environmental purpose.  This createunity for a different kind of conversation between investors and issuers, forging a connection that is values-based as well as purely economic.

In the same way, according to Suzanne Buchta of Bank of America, a big issuer of Green Bonds, Green Bonds create opportunities for new kinds of “corporate conversation” within companies – how green is this initiative, how green are we as a company?  Buchta suggests that the ESG disclosures from Green Bonds lead to such positive outcomes that they could become the norm for all bonds.

Interestingly, the Economist this week is also calling for companies to be obliged to assess and disclose their climate vulnerabilities by making mandatory the https://www.fsb.org/2017/06/recommendations-of-the-task-force-on-climate-related-financial-disclosures-2/ voluntary guidelines issued in 2017  by the private sector Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures set up by the Financial Stability Board.

This trend towards transparency is good for market-building.  It’s good for investors, companies and for employees of those companies.  And Green Bonds are playing an important catalytic role in this.

Green bonds programme Kenya – annual report 2017/18

Kenya Green Economy Strategy and Implementation Plan (GESIP) 2016–2030 has committed to investing $23.5 billion in Kenya’s green growth path. Moreover, investor demand for green bonds is getting stronger globally due to increasing evidence that “green” factors have a positive impact on long-term financial returns.

The Green Bonds Programme Kenya (GBPK) was launched in March 2017 with the aim of catalysing the market for green bonds.  Working together on this programme all partners recognise the outcomes will be larger and more sustainable – leading to a green economy for Kenya’s future generations.

Following the foundations laid by the Green Bonds Programme Kenya, the National Treasury has indicated that its debut sovereign green bond will be issued during the fiscal year 2018/19. This will make Kenya the first country in East and Central Africa to issue

Payroll lending review – Zambia

This report documents the results of an assessment of the payroll lending sector in Zambia. The study was commissioned by FSD Africa on behalf of the Bank of Zambia and was carried out between July and November 2014. The study forms part of a broader theme of work initiated by FSD Africa on credit markets within the region.

The study aimed to understand and quantify the extent of systemic and operational risks that may have arisen as payroll lending in Zambia has grown in prominence. Based on data collected from the largest payroll lenders, the research estimates that payroll loans now account for one-third of all Zambian banking system loan value, up from 25% at the end of 2008. Personal loans, driven by payroll loans, have been the largest contributor to commercial bank loan portfolio growth every year since 2011, accounting for just under one-third of the total growth of the Zambian credit markets between June 2010 and June 2014.

Yet even though payroll lending is a key driver of Zambian credit market growth, information is scant and oversight and regulation is limited.

Given the growing exposure of banks and microfinance institutions (MFIs) to payroll lending and the concentration of portfolio growth within particular market segments the assessment raises significant questions about the operational and systemic risks that have already been introduced into the Zambian financial sector, or that could become risks in the future.

The story of Kenya’s m-akiba: selling treasury bonds via mobi

After many years, the involvement of many partners and many iterations, M-Akiba, a Kenyan government bond sold through the mobile phone, was launched in 2017. M-Akiba (M – mobile, Akiba – savings in Kiswahili) was a three-year bond sold in denominations as small as KShs 3,000 (about US$30) with a coupon rate of 10% paid semi-annually and a tax-free status in line with other infrastructure bonds.  Through their mobile phones, retail investors could open securities accounts, purchase, pay, receive periodic interest/coupon and principal amount invested and trade their securities in the secondary market.

The initial idea to sell Kenyan government investments over a mobile phone emerged in 2011 under the leadership of the National Treasury and the Central Bank of Kenya.  Through M-Akiba the government aimed to broaden its investor base and reduce its borrowing costs. Before M-Akiba, the minimum investment amount for a bond was KShs 50,000 (about US$500) and required a cumbersome process to open up an investment account. There were only 10,000 retail investors in government, accounting for only 2% of the outstanding holdings of bonds. M-Akiba had the potential to reach over 30 million registered mobile money account holders.M-akiba logo

Early on, the World Bank Group provided technical support to the government on how to design the system and process for selling mobile treasury investments.  FSD Kenya commissioned MicroSave to explore how the target market might react to the concept and recommend design principles that could be incorporated into the offering. Many of the principles for the retail investors were addressed such as the ease of opening an account and denominations in thousands of shillings rather than tens or hundreds of thousands. However, the partners found it harder to address many of the recommendations for the unbanked segment such as the preference for even smaller sizes down to hundreds of shillings and tenures in months, not years. FSD Kenya also provided in-kind support in the year prior to launch to ensure that the technologies and systems were sufficiently robust for the offering through multiple payment platforms and a systems audit assurance for the clearing and settlement system.

The complex journey to launching involved a constellation of both public and private partners who each played different roles.

  • The National Treasury issued the bond with the Central Bank of Kenya.
  • The Capital Markets Authority provided regulatory oversite.
  • The Central Depository and Settlement Corporation (CDSC) of Kenya manages the register of bond holders with delegated authority from the Central Bank of Kenya as well as the periodic coupon payments and redemption.
  • The Kenya Association of Stockbrokers and Investment Banks (KASIB) and its members facilitated the market in the background as accounts were assigned to brokers for purchases and sales.
  • Safaricom’s M-Pesa and Airtel Money integrated their USSD channels (*889#) and payments functionality to the M-Akiba platform to enable customers to open accounts, purchase bonds and receive the semi-annual payments. The per transaction limit was KShs 70,000 (about $700) with the daily limit twice that.
  • After the pilot, PesaLink, the interbank real-time push payment platform, was also integrated into M-Akiba which enabled retail customers to purchase amounts up to KShs 999,999 (about $10,000) per transaction.
  • The Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) facilitates the on-line trading of the bonds through its system and also provides customer service support through a helpline.
  • Through a competitive bid process, Commercial Bank of Africa was selected as a market maker to guarantee purchases sold on the secondary market.

Although there was a lot of excitement and interest when the bond was piloted and launched, the number of retail customers purchasing bonds proved to be low. The bond was first offered in a KShs 150 million pilot phase in March 2017 for a period of three weeks.  Although 102,632 people registered for on the M-Akiba platform, only 5,692 investors purchased M-Akiba before the pilot was sold out implying much higher average purchases than the minimum.  If the initial customers had only bought at the minimum rate, 50,000 customers could have purchased, almost ten times as many as did.

M-Akiba was officially launched on 30 June 2017 (the last day of the government’s fiscal year), to much fanfare and great hopes that the KShs 1 billion on offer would also sell out and even allowed for an initial KShs 3.8 billion to be sold. Over 300,000 people registered on the M-Akiba platform but onl88 purchased M-Akiba bonds during the official launch totaling KShs 247.75 million, only about a quarter of the KShs 1 billion on offer. This even included an extended time period to allow for some of the complications caused by the election period.

Most of those who invested in the bond had higher education (with 59% having gone to university), 61% were formally employed, most had regular income (71% received salary or other regular monthly income) and most were urban (51% were from the capital Nairobi). Women made up 36.8% of those who invested. However, women were much more likely to actually buy the bond after registration.

Given the potential of this concept paired with the low uptake, FSD Africa commissioned BFA to undertake a post-issuance survey to understand the reasons for the unexpectedly low uptake and draw lessons that would be used to improve the product and support the replication of the concept in other markets. For instance, FSD Uganda is currently supporting Bank of Uganda in the development of a concept for distributing government securities to the mass market leveraging on mobile technology.

Although investment did not meet expectations, the post issuance study found that the product was fairly successful in bringing a new broad-based retail investor group into the market for government paper: 85% of customers had never bought a bond before and buyers were distributed across virtually all of Kenya’s 47 counties.  Most of the investors (84%) really liked the product and were likely to recommend it to someone else and 80% of those who invested were likely to invest again, if the product was issued today.

However, the study discovered a range of problems that hindered uptake:

  1. Poor timing – in the two years between the soft launch and product launch, deposit regulations changed, forcing banks to increase interest rates paid on savings from 0% to 7%, thereby diminishing the advantages of the bond. Furthermore, the bond launch coincided with nl elections, so media advertising about the product was swamped by election coverage.
  2. Poor understanding of product – those who registered but did not ultimately purchase the bond were less likely to know the interest rate, tenor, closing date, or other details about the product. That said, understanding was also poor among those who eventually bought the product: less than 2% knew to call the Nairobi Securities Exchange if they needed their money.
  3. Confusing purchase process – while registration was simple, the second stage of the process was confusing and gave no clear, immediate instruction for how to complete the purchase. Moreover, screenshot displays were sometimes misleading and/or confusing so individuals may not have realised their purchase was not complete after registration.
  4. Lack of prompts/reminders- over 60% of individuals interviewed did not receive a single reminder message after registering; and 70% of those who registered but didn’t purchase did not know he investment round was closing.
  5. Agents focused on registration – when agents visited offices, markets, and groups, there was a marked uptake in registrations. However, the agents did not encourage people to actually invest after registering. In addition, it was difficult for customers to get help from agents when they had follow-up questions after registration.
  6. Weak customer care practices – the only helpline available to customers, many of whom did not fully understand the product, was a landline, which was difficult to access and confusing, given the mobile nature of the product. Furthermore, when fraudulent messages circulated about the product, there was no easily accessible customer service available to refute them.
  7. Concerns about minimum investment – some customers felt the KSh 3,000 minimum investment would be better allocated to savings groups or trading opportunities that could provide quick returns or access to credit.

Despite not living up to its oitions, M-Akiba still stands as the first mobile treasury instrument to be sold in Africa. Although the first pilot and launch did not achieve desired outcome, there are significant opportunities to enhance the product in Kenya and replicate elsewhere drawing on the lessons and recommendations made from the post-issuance study and the lessons learned by the implementers to make it more relevant to the daily reality of citizens aiming to invest in their futures.

What banks can do to tame the tide of bad debts

Alex is a mid-manager at an NGO in Nairobi.  He’s servicing a home loan for a two-bedroom apartment in an upmarket neighborhood, and two car loans – one for him and one for his wife. His four-year-old son is in a private nursery school and Alex is considering enrolling him in a private elementary school next year.

Two years ago, he took another loan to buy the land where he intends to build his family home. The land is 50 kilometres from the main road and the access road is yet to be paved. None of the owners of other plots near his have considered developing their properties but there are plans to connect electricity and water.

The family goes on holiday twice a year – again, financed through personal loans. Alex is also financially responsible for taking care of his elderly mother, who has no income and lives in the village. On top of that, he pays for his younger sister’s college education; she’ll be finalising her diploma course in the next two years. He also employs his cousin, who recently of college, in a small business Alex started to supplement his income.

Since he has a pay slip and a contract of employment, the bank considers Alex to be a good customer and often tops up his home loan whenever he faces financial pressure. In addition, Alex is a member of a SACCO. He has a loan there, as well as two peer groups – one is a welfare group and the other is an investment club.

With all this to consider about Alex’s background, how can the bank properly assess the risk of lending to him? Risk management practices vary from bank to bank depending on their policies on granting credit. Poor credit risk management can lead to institutional failure. This, in turn, can reduce financial inclusion.

In 2016, FSD Africa commissioned a market study to assess demand for, and supply of, risk management training for the financial sector. The study looked at three markets: DRC, Ghana and Kenya.

It found that in most institutions, after a brief orientation or introductory course, new staff members are puto operations without appropriate skills training. In a majority of institutions surveyed, no risk management training is provided to entry-level staff (those in their first or second year at the institution).

Not surprisingly, most institutions cited poor portfolio performance as a symptom of poorly trained staff.  But the importance of entry-level training is still underestimated. Entry-level staff are the foundation of any financial sector. Without strong skills at the foot of the staff pyramid, middle managers struggle to control risk in daily operations. And in addition to strengthening risk management, better entry-level staff training can lead to an improvement in the quality of customer service.

How, then, can such training be improved? Above all, the study recommends the development of a comprehensive risk management training programme. This would address risk management training needs, particularly for entry-level staff, and help them to stem the rising tide of bad loans.

Five reasons why capital markets matter in Africa

The significance of developing domestic capital markets as a means of financing priority sectors and driving economic development is increasingly being acknowledged by policy makers in Africa.

For instance, the African Union (AU), Agenda 2063, prioritises the development of capital markets on the continent to strengthen domestic resource mobilisation and double its contribution to development financing. Similar support is found in several national visions including Nigeria (FSS2020)Zambia (Vision 2030)Rwanda (Vision 2020)Uganda (Vision 2040) and Kenya (Vision 2030). About US$1 trillion in assets are currently held by pension, insurance and collective investment vehicles across sub-Saharan Africa. These funds have a serious problem finding enough investments that meet their risk and return requirements – there just isn’t enough “product” for them.  It means that there are projects today – e.g. in infrastructure – that are not getting financed. But this also has implications for the long-term ability of pension funds to produce adequate incomes for pensioners.

While central to facilitating SSA economic development, there has been little focus on understanding precisely why capital markets matter in Africa.

So why does Africa need capital markets? This article identifies five reason reasons:

  1. Providing long-term financing for priority sectors

Africa faces huge long-term financing needs for the real and social sectors.  FSD Africa (FSDA) estimates the funding gap for SMEs, infrastructure, housingness at over US$300 billion per year. The World Bank estimates that Africa’s infrastructure deficit reduces per capita GDP growth by 2 percentage points each year, delaying poverty reduction efforts. Equally, the Centre for Affordable Housing in Africa, estimates a housing deficit of at least 25 million units in Nigeria, Kenya, Angola, Ethiopia, Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire. Local currency capital markets can contribute to narrowing the financing gap across these sectors. Capital markets provide long-term funds to growing businesses, infrastructure and housing. Capital markets can also support the financing of social sectors, including health and education.

  1. Complementing reductions in concessional funding

About half of the countries in sub-Sahara Africa are classified as middle income according to the World Bank. In the last decade, 10 countries in sub-Saharan Africa including Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana and Zambia, have joined this middle-income rank. This implies that these countries will gradually be weaned off the World Bank Group’s concessional lending window, International Development Association (IDA). In addition, they can expect to receive less concessional funding from bilateral donors. This implies that many of these countries will need to access commercial funding sources. The Eurobond market, one of such sources, exposes countries to significant foreign currency risk, because these bonds are denominated in hard currencies, leading to higher chances of defaulting on this debt. Local currency capital markets can ideally complement external funding to meet developmental challenges.

  1. Financing global challenges

According to the African Development Bank (AfDB), the share of Africans living in urban areas is set to rise from 36% in 2010 to 50% by 2030. Urbanisation at this rate can cause significant stress to infrastructure, social services and proliferation of slums. According to the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), Africa is projected to bear the greatest impact of climate change with the costs of adaption being estimated between 5-10% of GDP. Capital markets can contribute to financing of climate change investments through green bonds. Capital markets can also support urban development by financing urban infrastructure and housing projects. Capital markets instruments including Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS), incorporating so-called Social REITS, can support affordable housing finance.

  1. Managing foreign currency and re-financing risks

The income streams associated with key infrastructure and housing investments are often denominated in local currency. By funding these investments in long-term local currency instruments, governments and the private sector avoid foreign exchange and refinancing risks. The Asian financial crisis in the 1990s and the crisis in Latin America in the 1980s powerfully demonstrated the importance of developing local currency markets. In Asia, overexposure to foreign currency loans led to economic collapse in several countries. On the other hand, refinancing risk arises where short-term debt is used to fund long-term projects. Failure to roll over this debt in the short term can lead to high financing costs and potentially defaults. Numerous examples exist where this has resulted in collapsed companies and job losses.

  1. Diversifying the financial sector

The financial sector in Africa is relatively small and bank-dominated. There have been significant advances in the banking sector over the last decade with increasing access to previously excluded populations, especially using mobile technology. However, the banking sector remains characterised by high interest rate margins and high returns on equity and assets. This implies that the sector is not playing its intermediation role effectively. By developing capital markets, countries can facilitate the diversification of the financial sector, providing a useful complement to the banking sector (at times competing with the banking sector, at other times encouraging it, e.g. through risk sharing instruments, to play a bigger role in new areas) and providing the public and private sectors access to long-term financing which is so hard to come by in SSA.  Capital markets can also help create new kinds of institutions through equity investment, tus broadening the sources of supply of finance.

As a strategic response, FSDA aims to transform capital markets in Africa into a credible source of funding for the real and social sectors. The priorities over the next five years include the bond markets (both government and non-government), alternative finance (including fintech and crowd funding, REITs and Islamic Finance), and equity (public and private) market development. Support for non-government bonds will focus on green bonds and issues in both the real and social sectors.

FSDA will leverage technical assistance interventions on the regulatory front with transactions support, aimed at developing a pipeline of potential issuers, and catalytic investments through development capital (DevCap). FSDA also aims to build the information base around long term finance – databases currently are scarce and incomplete – and will work closely with institutional investors to build their capacity to invest in the newer asset classes. FSDA will actively forge perships to implement its long-term finance agenda.,

Conduits of capital: onshore financial centres and private equity in Africa

With growing interest in Africa as an investment destination, the question arises as to which of its major cities are going to emerge as the region’s financial centres. Which cities are going to be able to attract international capital at scale, as well as growing numbers of financial firms and their technically skilled employees?

This research deals with the sometimes controversial topic of offshore and onshore financial centres. Specifically it asks whether there are onshore centres in sub-Saharan Africa that could rival Mauritius as a domicile for fund administration business.  Mauritius has become the default domicile option for funds and other investment vehicles targeting sub-Saharan Africa.  What made it successful at this kind of business? Does Africa need another Mauritius-like centre or is one enough? What do fund managers and institutional investors really think about the perceptions of offshores centres as places that facilitate capital flight from developing countries, are not transparent and are soft on “harmful” tax practices?

But there is a broader question here.  How can donor funding support the broad financial sector and other reforms that African countries need to make in order to become attractive to African and international investors seeking to invest long-term, patient capital in African businesses?  And where do financial centre strategies fit into that?

This research has been carried out in collaboration with the Emerging Markets Private Equity Association (EMPEA), DFID and the UK’s development finance institution, CDC Group plc.  It contains the results of an online survey of fund managers and institutional investors and also five contrasting “position papers” from experts in the field.

The survey reveals a strong preference among fund managers for offshore structures as well as a high degree of satisfaction among fund managers and institutional investors in Mauritius – but also increasing interest in, and use of, onshore centres.

Financial centre strategies are an expression of a country’s economic direction of travel and can be a powerful branding instrument. These strategies symbolise a country’s support for the development of an enabling environment that encourages economic diversification and innovation.

But, as the research suggests, countries also need to “get real” about the challenges involved in setting up credible financial centres.  They need to set proper targets, be accountable for the delivery of these targets and ensure that real political capital is invested.