Partner Organization: Bankable Frontier Associates (BFA)

Financial inclusion for refugees in Uganda: baseline report

We have launched a landmark study in Uganda with the aim of understanding the different sources of income for refugees in collaboration with FSD Uganda and BFA Global. This study aims to uncover the uses of their finances and the financial products and services they use and supporting the development of financial products and services offered by Equity Bank Uganda Limited (EBUL), Vision Fund Uganda (VFU) and Rural Finance Initiative (RUFI) and evaluating the impact of those products and services on refugee livelihoods.

Uganda is host to over 1.1 million refugees, most of whom are new arrivals from July 2016 as a result of instability in South Sudan. Uganda also has a progressive policy towards refugees allowing them to freely move, work, go to school and access healthcare. The refugee population also forms part of the country’s National Development Plan. According to 2018 figures from UNHCR and Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), refugees are economically active. A total of 45% are engaged in entrepreneurship or formal employment, 24% in farming, 15% receive remittances, and 6% receive assistance from UNHCR/WFP. Despite this, financial inclusion remains a challenge for the refugee population, with few financial service providers (FSPs) aware of or interested, preferring to focus on more traditional banking clients. As a result, most refugees are only able to access financial services through informal savings groups, SACCO linkage banking and mobile money. The limited new FSP activity that does exist tends to focus on mobile-enabled cash transfer services.

Linking refugees in Uganda to formal financial services

The Financial Inclusion for Refugees (FI4R) project which was jointly supported by FSD Uganda and BFA Global, and other partners (Equity Bank Uganda, VisionFund Uganda and Rural Finance Initiative) worked to offer financial services to refugees in Uganda.

In a world dealing with unprecedented crises, over 100 million people – equivalent to the population of the world’s 14th largest country – find themselves forcibly displaced. On May 23, 2022, the UNHCR unveiled a staggering reality: 1% of humanity is on the move, struggling for survival away from their homes. Beyond the distressing stories of human suffering, there lies a lesser-known struggle – the battle for financial inclusion and dignity. In this video, we uncover the profound journey of resilience and hope in the face of adversity of refugees in Uganda.

Through the lens of the financial diaries methodology, this animation offers a unique glimpse into the financial lives of refugees, revealing challenges, opportunities, and the relentless spirit of those fighting to rebuild their lives. The project, in partnership with a spectrum of financial service providers, including banks, MFIs, mobile network operators, and SACCOs, showcases practical insights and hopeful stories of empowerment and resilience.

 

Finance for all: The financial inclusion for refugees project in Uganda

Late last year, we joined FSD Uganda and BFA Global in Uganda where we are implementing the Financial Inclusion for Refugees Project (FI4R) in Nakivale, Bidi Bidi and Palorinya refugee camps and with urban refugees in Kampala. This project aims to drive the availability of financial services to refugees and host communities. We are also conducting research with the aim of understanding the different sources of income for refugees, the uses of their finances and the financial products and services they use and supporting the development of financial products and services offered by Equity Bank Uganda Limited (EBUL), Vision Fund Uganda (VFU) and Rural Finance Initiative (RUFI) and evaluating the impact of those products and services on refugee livelihoods.

The project kicked off with extensive focus group discussions and individual interviews. It is the first Financial Diaries project with refugees which will not only provide a detailed picture, over the course of a year, of the incomes, expenditures and financial flows of refugee households but also reflect on how financial service providers engage with these households and make a difference to their financial picture.

Here are some of the preliminary discoveries from the initial baseline study.,

The story of Kenya’s m-akiba: selling treasury bonds via mobi

After many years, the involvement of many partners and many iterations, M-Akiba, a Kenyan government bond sold through the mobile phone, was launched in 2017. M-Akiba (M – mobile, Akiba – savings in Kiswahili) was a three-year bond sold in denominations as small as KShs 3,000 (about US$30) with a coupon rate of 10% paid semi-annually and a tax-free status in line with other infrastructure bonds.  Through their mobile phones, retail investors could open securities accounts, purchase, pay, receive periodic interest/coupon and principal amount invested and trade their securities in the secondary market.

The initial idea to sell Kenyan government investments over a mobile phone emerged in 2011 under the leadership of the National Treasury and the Central Bank of Kenya.  Through M-Akiba the government aimed to broaden its investor base and reduce its borrowing costs. Before M-Akiba, the minimum investment amount for a bond was KShs 50,000 (about US$500) and required a cumbersome process to open up an investment account. There were only 10,000 retail investors in government, accounting for only 2% of the outstanding holdings of bonds. M-Akiba had the potential to reach over 30 million registered mobile money account holders.M-akiba logo

Early on, the World Bank Group provided technical support to the government on how to design the system and process for selling mobile treasury investments.  FSD Kenya commissioned MicroSave to explore how the target market might react to the concept and recommend design principles that could be incorporated into the offering. Many of the principles for the retail investors were addressed such as the ease of opening an account and denominations in thousands of shillings rather than tens or hundreds of thousands. However, the partners found it harder to address many of the recommendations for the unbanked segment such as the preference for even smaller sizes down to hundreds of shillings and tenures in months, not years. FSD Kenya also provided in-kind support in the year prior to launch to ensure that the technologies and systems were sufficiently robust for the offering through multiple payment platforms and a systems audit assurance for the clearing and settlement system.

The complex journey to launching involved a constellation of both public and private partners who each played different roles.

  • The National Treasury issued the bond with the Central Bank of Kenya.
  • The Capital Markets Authority provided regulatory oversite.
  • The Central Depository and Settlement Corporation (CDSC) of Kenya manages the register of bond holders with delegated authority from the Central Bank of Kenya as well as the periodic coupon payments and redemption.
  • The Kenya Association of Stockbrokers and Investment Banks (KASIB) and its members facilitated the market in the background as accounts were assigned to brokers for purchases and sales.
  • Safaricom’s M-Pesa and Airtel Money integrated their USSD channels (*889#) and payments functionality to the M-Akiba platform to enable customers to open accounts, purchase bonds and receive the semi-annual payments. The per transaction limit was KShs 70,000 (about $700) with the daily limit twice that.
  • After the pilot, PesaLink, the interbank real-time push payment platform, was also integrated into M-Akiba which enabled retail customers to purchase amounts up to KShs 999,999 (about $10,000) per transaction.
  • The Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) facilitates the on-line trading of the bonds through its system and also provides customer service support through a helpline.
  • Through a competitive bid process, Commercial Bank of Africa was selected as a market maker to guarantee purchases sold on the secondary market.

Although there was a lot of excitement and interest when the bond was piloted and launched, the number of retail customers purchasing bonds proved to be low. The bond was first offered in a KShs 150 million pilot phase in March 2017 for a period of three weeks.  Although 102,632 people registered for on the M-Akiba platform, only 5,692 investors purchased M-Akiba before the pilot was sold out implying much higher average purchases than the minimum.  If the initial customers had only bought at the minimum rate, 50,000 customers could have purchased, almost ten times as many as did.

M-Akiba was officially launched on 30 June 2017 (the last day of the government’s fiscal year), to much fanfare and great hopes that the KShs 1 billion on offer would also sell out and even allowed for an initial KShs 3.8 billion to be sold. Over 300,000 people registered on the M-Akiba platform but onl88 purchased M-Akiba bonds during the official launch totaling KShs 247.75 million, only about a quarter of the KShs 1 billion on offer. This even included an extended time period to allow for some of the complications caused by the election period.

Most of those who invested in the bond had higher education (with 59% having gone to university), 61% were formally employed, most had regular income (71% received salary or other regular monthly income) and most were urban (51% were from the capital Nairobi). Women made up 36.8% of those who invested. However, women were much more likely to actually buy the bond after registration.

Given the potential of this concept paired with the low uptake, FSD Africa commissioned BFA to undertake a post-issuance survey to understand the reasons for the unexpectedly low uptake and draw lessons that would be used to improve the product and support the replication of the concept in other markets. For instance, FSD Uganda is currently supporting Bank of Uganda in the development of a concept for distributing government securities to the mass market leveraging on mobile technology.

Although investment did not meet expectations, the post issuance study found that the product was fairly successful in bringing a new broad-based retail investor group into the market for government paper: 85% of customers had never bought a bond before and buyers were distributed across virtually all of Kenya’s 47 counties.  Most of the investors (84%) really liked the product and were likely to recommend it to someone else and 80% of those who invested were likely to invest again, if the product was issued today.

However, the study discovered a range of problems that hindered uptake:

  1. Poor timing – in the two years between the soft launch and product launch, deposit regulations changed, forcing banks to increase interest rates paid on savings from 0% to 7%, thereby diminishing the advantages of the bond. Furthermore, the bond launch coincided with nl elections, so media advertising about the product was swamped by election coverage.
  2. Poor understanding of product – those who registered but did not ultimately purchase the bond were less likely to know the interest rate, tenor, closing date, or other details about the product. That said, understanding was also poor among those who eventually bought the product: less than 2% knew to call the Nairobi Securities Exchange if they needed their money.
  3. Confusing purchase process – while registration was simple, the second stage of the process was confusing and gave no clear, immediate instruction for how to complete the purchase. Moreover, screenshot displays were sometimes misleading and/or confusing so individuals may not have realised their purchase was not complete after registration.
  4. Lack of prompts/reminders- over 60% of individuals interviewed did not receive a single reminder message after registering; and 70% of those who registered but didn’t purchase did not know he investment round was closing.
  5. Agents focused on registration – when agents visited offices, markets, and groups, there was a marked uptake in registrations. However, the agents did not encourage people to actually invest after registering. In addition, it was difficult for customers to get help from agents when they had follow-up questions after registration.
  6. Weak customer care practices – the only helpline available to customers, many of whom did not fully understand the product, was a landline, which was difficult to access and confusing, given the mobile nature of the product. Furthermore, when fraudulent messages circulated about the product, there was no easily accessible customer service available to refute them.
  7. Concerns about minimum investment – some customers felt the KSh 3,000 minimum investment would be better allocated to savings groups or trading opportunities that could provide quick returns or access to credit.

Despite not living up to its oitions, M-Akiba still stands as the first mobile treasury instrument to be sold in Africa. Although the first pilot and launch did not achieve desired outcome, there are significant opportunities to enhance the product in Kenya and replicate elsewhere drawing on the lessons and recommendations made from the post-issuance study and the lessons learned by the implementers to make it more relevant to the daily reality of citizens aiming to invest in their futures.

Are refugees viable customers for banks?

Refugees are not an obvious customer segment for financial service providers (FSPs). It is not hard to see why: in a world where refugees are too often portrayed as very poor, vulnerable, with few tangible assets and little stability, where are the incentives to enter such a challenging market?

While FDPs often are vulnerable, poor, and burdened with instability, through a different lens they can present an intriguing opportunity. In places like Rwanda, large refugee camps can exist for decades and are home to vibrant micro-economies. Moreover, many FDPs fit the basic profile to access formal financial services; they have regular income, formal identification, and a need for financial products.

A study conducted by BFA Global in partnership with FSD AfricaAccess to Finance Rwanda[1] (AFR), and UNHCR last year suggests that there are good reasons to believe that forcibly displaced persons (FDPs) can be a profitable customer group for FSPs.

Demand: Refugees Need Financial Services

Many refugees not only receive aid, they also earn income, thereby creating sufficient cash flow to drive demand for financial services.

Although they are plagued by instability and insecurity, many refugees start businesses and some also have jobs. About a third, or 27% of refugees, are self-employed, providing services such as dressmaking and barbering largely within the camp. An additional 10% of refugees earn a monthly salary from employment. Finally, 4% receive remittances.

 In addition to the income earned from work, 95% of refugees receive humanitarian aid in the form of monthly cash transfers. The World Food Programme (WFP) and the UNHCR are shifting from providing refugee households with in-kind humanitarian support to giving them cash.  At the time of our study, refugee households in four out of the six camps in Rwanda were receiving monthly cash transfers. The other two camps were soon to migrate from in-kind to cash transfers.

With these regular inflows of cash, refugees need a place to receive and store their money, creating a clear demand for secure financial services.

Supply: Refugees can be a profitable segment

Not only is there substantial demand for financial services, our analysis suggests refugees are a viable customer segment. Of the 160,000 men, women and children who are displaced in Rwanda, we estimate that about 44,000 adults have sufficient monthly cash flow to make them viable customers for FSPs, with additional opportunities for cross selling.

To start, the basic transaction accounts that banks offer other low-income Rwandans would likely be even more successful with refugees who have regular, stable cash flows. Moreover, accounts that refugees open to receive their monthly cash transfers are notlikely to become dormant or inactive, as is generally the case with many low balance accounts, making refugees a more attractive proposition for banks.

 In addition, there are opportunities for cost savings using mobile money. Although low-income households tend to use informal mechanisms such as savings groupto manage their finances, 90% of the refugees we interviewed use mobile money regularly and 95% already have experience using a bank account, thereby decreasing upfront training and client education costs.

Finally, there are opportunities to cross sell other products although many segments are profitable with just a savings product. Our dynamic net present value model estimates FSPs can profitably serve refugees with salaried jobs, those who are self-employed, and those who receive regular remittances with only a savings proposition! In fact, we believe that these three segments, who together make up 41% of the adult refugee population, can be just as profitable to FSPs as typical low-income account holders in Rwanda.

That said, FSPs that offer only a savings product to refugees who depend solely on cash transfers are not likely to have a profitable proposition. Targeted cross-selling of other financial products, such as a loan or micro-insurance, will be needed to improve the FSP’s profitability for this segment.

Regulatory Environment: Refugees Qualify for Financial Services

Given the significant forces for demand and supply, the regulatory environment is the last piece of the puzzle. Fortunately, we found that refugees meet the formal requirements for opening a bank account in Rwanda.

Although most refugees do not have a government-issued ID card (which FSPs typically use for KYC purposes), all refugees have a proof of registration document issued by the Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs. FSPs that want to serve refugees can request regulatory approval to use the proof of registration document to open accounts; the National Bank of Rwanda has approved such requests in the past.

Ultimately, our research suggests that FSPs shouldn’t be guided by the stereotypical narratives about refugees. We found that while refugees face difficult circumstances, they are also viable customers for FSPs that take an innovative approach to product design and customer acquisition.

As added incentive, in December 2017, FSD Africa launched an innovation competition to provide FSPs with ideas about how to bring financial access to refugees with grant funding of up to £160,000. The competition has received 21 concept notes to date.


[1]Rwanda is a signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees[1], which guarantees refugees the freedom of movement, right to work and other liberties and has been hosting refugees for over 20 years.

[1] BFA’s calculations based on the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (2016) data set from a research conducted in May 20

A tale of two markets

Imagine Johannesburg, with its highways, traffic signals, shopping malls, chain restaurants and supermarkets. Now picture Nakuru, a small Kenyan town, filled with old, narrow roads clogged with tuk-tuks and street vendors, pushing themselves shoe-less into the traffic and hauling heavy hand-drawn carts stacked with goods that will fill the small, owner-operated shops and kiosks, 10 on every block. If you were getting by on $5 per day, where would you rather live?

Reproduced from CGAP

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Five things we used to think about Africa’s credit market

For years, donors and regulators have been trying to cook up more mature consumer credit markets in Africa. We used to think we knew the essential ingredients for baking the perfect credit market cake.  But when we look around the world at how credit markets are functioning—especially for low income groups—we find that the credit cake is burnt in some places and raw in others. Something is wrong with the recipe itself.

My research team and I collected in-depth stories from consumers in Kenya, Ghana, and South Africa, to understand the experiences of what we call “cuspers.” People on the ‘cusp’ of poverty and the middle class, already represent almost a quarter (23%) of Africans and as a group, they are growing. They are getting by on $2-5 per day and straddling the informal and formal economy. Their stories tell us that if we want credit markets that support upward mobility—and not just churn—we need to think again about our old recipe.

So here are five things we used to think:

1: l and should displace informal credit. We used to think, that banks and microfinance intuitions are implicitly more “fair” because they have to abide by consumer protection regulations. By extending formal options to previously excluded borrowers, we thought we were liberating them from predatory informal lenders who overcharge, lock people in debt cycles, and use unethical collections practices. We used to think that if banks cut back lending to low-income groups, evil loan sharks will fill the void.

But the reality is much more complicated. Firstly, informal lenders are not all evil. In fact, people told us that informal lenders—both those who charge interest and those who do not—were often more understanding and flexible than formal lenders. Some accept broader forms of collateral and proof of credit worthiness, simplify application and disbursement processes, and explain terms in ways that were understandable, even for the semi-literate. Many informal lenders even halt the accumulation ost when a borrower falls behind, which is very rare for a bank.

Secondly, informal lenders rarely offer products that actually compete with formal lenders. We found that most informal loans were significantly smaller. Informal lenders often cornered the market for $10 loans, while banks were going after those that were many times larger, rarely under $200. Only in Kenya (because of M-Shwari) do we see a bank offering a service that actually competes with informal lenders.

Finally, formal lenders are not all pillars of ethics and as an alternative, people don’t run to loan sharks. We were told stories of predatory lending, opaque terms and conditions, unclear—even intentionally obscured—loan pricing, and condescending and insulting bank staff. And our evidence shows that the main substitutes for formal borrowing are saving and delaying or forgoing consumption.

2: Credit for investment is “good”; credit for consumption is “bad.”  We used to think that because consumption credit does not produce a return, repayment of consumption loans is difficult and just increases the cost of consumption. But, we found many entrepreneurs borrowing for consumption as a means of keeping capital in their businesses. As long as this is a temporary fix and not a habit, consumption borrowing can be hugely helpful. We also see that borrowing for important, time-saving assg machines—can make a huge difference in the productivity of people’s lives.

3: Digital is inevitable. Digital is better. Of course digital lending can reduce cost but, digital is not moving as quickly as one might expect. In South Africa, despite widespread adoption of mobile phones we still see most lending taking place over the counter. In Kenya, mobile lending is taking off, but we see evidence that the lack of a personal relationship with the lender proves a disincentive for on time payments.  Many borrowers delay and default on very tiny loan payments, not because they don’t have the money, but because a distant, digital lender feels so far away.

4: Don’t dampen provider incentives. Yes, we need providers willing to invest in going after new markets, but what happens when those incentives work too well?  Credit to cuspers has been shown to be ‘price inelastic’. The more that’s offered, the more people borrow. Regulation matters.

5: The more cr sharing, the better. We used to think that the better lenders can know their borrowers and assess risk, the more competition and the lower interest rates will fall for good borrowers. Instead, we see that—without effective regulatory enforcement—near perfect information sharing can lead to aggressive lending practices, with lenders pushing credit on viable borrowers. In South Africa, where so much is known about borrowers, risk models can become more and more precise, encouraging lenders to simply price for more risk, increasing interest rates for all and of course the sheer volume of credit extended. In other markets, where lenders know less about borrowers, they are forced to be more cautious.

Credit on the Cusp is an FSD Africa project, implemented by Bankable Frontier Associates.<