Partner Organization: FSD Kenya

Ten years of a market systems approach in the Kenyan finance market

Kenya is seen widely as a ‘stand out’ success story on financial inclusion. The 10-year period from 2005 to 2015 witnessed enormous change in the financial sector. In 2015, two-thirds of the adult population have access to formal financial services compared with one-quarter in 2005; 8 million more people have gained access to services. Finance providers, previously little engaged with and in retreat from the mass, low-income market, are now innovating and expanding.

These changes have coincided with the life of FSD Kenya, an organisation formed in 2005 to facilitate financial inclusion, with a distinctive approach – market systems development or ‘making markets work for the poor’ (M4P), and a distinctive organisational form – an independent trust. This case study is about FSD Kenya, the role it has played in Kenya and what can be learned from this. It shows that FSD Kenya’s contribution to financial inclusion, while varying between individual activities, has been substantial in aggregate, and t(beyond Kenya), there are important lessons emerging from this experience for development funding and facilitating organisations.

The Kenyan financial system is bigger, more dynamic, more profitable and more innovative than ten years ago. It is also more inclusive, even if poor people have not been the biggest beneficiaries of its growth. Although helped by a generally favourable environment, FSD Kenya has contributed significantly to this change, pushing inclusion more quickly and successfully into the workings of the Kenyan financial sector. It has done this by intervening in a range of ways, throughout its ten-year life, and with different partners in the public and private sectors. While the specific focus of interventions has varied it has involved work on different aspects of the market system including capacity-building, innovation, regulation, research and public infrastructure.

For funders and facilitators alike, the most important lesson from the experience is that FSD Kenya’s positive impact is vindication of its different function and form. The M4P approach that has guided its work has provided an appropriate framework and guidance for intervention and set a level of ambition that matches the development needs of the sector. As a trust, it has had the flexibility, operational space, resources and independence to engage effectively. More specifically, FSD Kenya has been effective because it has ‘got the big things right’ as a market facilitator.

Overall, for the financial inclusion/financial market development field globally, FSD Kenya’s experience therefore offers valuable learning for development organisations – funding agencies, practitioner facilitators, policy makers and researchers. It does not – cannot – provide all the answers to the challenge of facilitating inclusive financial markets, where some of the issues to be confronted – such as the ‘how much is enough’ challenge and political economy dilemmas – are inherently intractable. Nonetheless, FSD Kenya’s experiencection on how to engage effectively to bring about systemic change in financial (and other) markets.

The art of market facilitation: learning from the financial sector deepening network

Market facilitation (M4P) is an approach to promote systemic change—change that goes beyond individual players and that is relevant to the wider environment, affecting many. Market systems development requires that organisations play a facilitating role. Standing outside of the market system, facilitators work with different players within the system, to make it work more effectively. Their essential role is active and catalytic, to enable others to do rather than do themselves—stimulating changes in a market system without becoming part of it.

Understanding this concept and applying it in market systems development initiatives is no mean feat. Market facilitators, donors and practitioners must draw from a wide range of tools and techniques to put market facilitation into practice. Developing and maintaining partnerships, managing risks, deploying flexible intervention tactics, establishing a measurement system and communicating effectively are all useful learning points for those working in this field. Knowing when to exit an intervention is just as critical as identifying and selecting the right partners to work with and understanding these complexities can have an impact on the effectiveness of interventions. Market facilitation as a practice is more of an art than a science, directed by principles rather than lists of actions, which can make it difficult to translate the theory into practice.

There is limited evidence from the field on how to apply this approach in a way that ensures interventions are both scalable and sustainable. In June 2015, FSD Africa commissioned the Springfield Centre to produce: a) one
comprehensive case study of FSD Kenya—a financial market facilitation agency in Nairobi, Kenya; and b) six minicase studies of financial market facilitation interventions from the wider FSD Network, by the FinMark Trust, FSD Kenya, FSD Tanzania and FSD Zambia. The aim of this process was to build the knowledge base around the art of market facilitation in the field. These case studies revealed a lot of insights about effective market facilitation, the challenges the Financial Sector Deepening (FSD) Network faced while designing and delivering interventions using the M4P approach and the lessons they have learned so far.

The M4P synthesis paper (this publication) explores the art of market facilitation in action through the lens of the FSD network and synthesises learnings gained from these case studies to build understanding around the M4P approach. The paper examines the wider lessons and challenges that emerge for organisations addressing the dilemmas of developing financial markets for the poor and how they differ significantly from other conventional approaches.

FSD Network collaborations aimed at harnessing the power of the digital platform economy

Posted on by Kihingu Inc

Digital platforms are virtual marketplaces that connect providers of goods and services with consumers. In 2018, the i2i facility identified 277 digital
platforms, of which around 80% were of African origin. These platforms derive revenues from facilitating interactions between providers and consumers of goods and services. Transactions are normally settled on the platform through various payment methods, such as bank cards, bank transfers, cash, mobile money and digital wallets.

A growing number of Africa-based digital platforms are starting to leverage their technology to channel financial services to their customers, therefore providing early demonstration of the ability of platforms to extend financial service reach to new or under-served individuals and small enterprises. They offer financial service providers access to customer data that enables more appropriate product design, as well as access to a range of payment solutions through which they can service these customers.

We are currently providing support to two innovative projects that leverage platform technology in collaboration with FSDs.  This support s provided by Cenfri, through our Risk, Remittances and Integrity (RRI) programme.

Addressing risks and constraints in Kenya’s housing sector

 

 

 

We have forged a partnership with FSD Kenya and iBUILD, through Cenfri to understand and address constraints to providing construction-linked financial services in Kenya.

Kenya’s housing shortage is estimated to be around two million units, with over 60% of the country’s urban population reported to be living in slums. Only 7% of Kenyans are able to access formal housing finance, such as mortgage finance. Construction workers, building suppliers and other housing industry players face various risks, ranging from injury, loss of income and breach of contract, as well as constraints such as lack of capital and fluctuations in price or consumer demand.

iBUILD is a digital platform that offers the potential to contribute to tackling some of these issues and broadening financial service delivery to the sector. It connects construction workers with people looking to build and facilitates open access to housing support services that guide individuals through housing construction and reconstruction processes.

Cenfri has signed an MOU with FSD Kenya to rtake consumer research to help build a business case for insurance companies, banks, Microfinance Institutions (MFIs), Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) and others to offer construction-linked financial products to users of the iBUILD app in Kenya.

The consumer research will focus on three iBUILD small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) users: construction workers, contractors and building suppliers.  It will tease out the issues they face and identify how financial services could add value to their businesses, including asking the questions: How can finance add real value to small businesses and informal workers in construction?  How does their participation in a digital platform help facilitate the delivery of innovative solutions?

The ultimate objective of this research is to support the launch of a financial service (insurance, credit or savings) that is distributed through iBUILD to its customers. FSD Kenya will engage with financial service providers to understand what such a financial produccould look like.

Building the resilience of e-hailing drivers in Rwanda

Through Cenfri, Access to Finance Rwanda (AFR) and Yego – an e-hailing taxi service in Rwanda – we are collaborating to help improve the resilience of e-hailing drivers by understanding the financial service needs of Yego’s drivers.

Yego is a digital platform that was launched in Rwanda in 2018. Like Uber, it connects passengers and local drivers of cars and motorbikes (moto) through a computer or mobile device. Yego currently has around 11,000 motorcycle and 2,000 taxi drivers signed up in Rwanda and is looking to expand on the continent.

Initial scoping suggests an encouraging opportunity to offer financial services, specifically insurance, to Yego drivers, who report that they trust Yego and would be open to procuring insurance through the company. Yego is keen on partnering with insurance firms to develop products suitable to the needs of the Yego drivers.

Cenfri has signed an MoU with AFR and Yego to support this collaboration. The objective will be to build a business case for financial service providers, specifically insurers, to service tharket through digital platforms.  AFR and Cenfri will provide technical assistance to Yego in the form of consumer research and support to identifying an insurance partner, as well as during the product development process.

The story of Kenya’s m-akiba: selling treasury bonds via mobi

Posted on by TIMOTHYRADIER

After many years, the involvement of many partners and many iterations, M-Akiba, a Kenyan government bond sold through the mobile phone, was launched in 2017. M-Akiba (M – mobile, Akiba – savings in Kiswahili) was a three-year bond sold in denominations as small as KShs 3,000 (about US$30) with a coupon rate of 10% paid semi-annually and a tax-free status in line with other infrastructure bonds.  Through their mobile phones, retail investors could open securities accounts, purchase, pay, receive periodic interest/coupon and principal amount invested and trade their securities in the secondary market.

The initial idea to sell Kenyan government investments over a mobile phone emerged in 2011 under the leadership of the National Treasury and the Central Bank of Kenya.  Through M-Akiba the government aimed to broaden its investor base and reduce its borrowing costs. Before M-Akiba, the minimum investment amount for a bond was KShs 50,000 (about US$500) and required a cumbersome process to open up an investment account. There were only 10,000 retail investors in government, accounting for only 2% of the outstanding holdings of bonds. M-Akiba had the potential to reach over 30 million registered mobile money account holders.M-akiba logo

Early on, the World Bank Group provided technical support to the government on how to design the system and process for selling mobile treasury investments.  FSD Kenya commissioned MicroSave to explore how the target market might react to the concept and recommend design principles that could be incorporated into the offering. Many of the principles for the retail investors were addressed such as the ease of opening an account and denominations in thousands of shillings rather than tens or hundreds of thousands. However, the partners found it harder to address many of the recommendations for the unbanked segment such as the preference for even smaller sizes down to hundreds of shillings and tenures in months, not years. FSD Kenya also provided in-kind support in the year prior to launch to ensure that the technologies and systems were sufficiently robust for the offering through multiple payment platforms and a systems audit assurance for the clearing and settlement system.

The complex journey to launching involved a constellation of both public and private partners who each played different roles.

  • The National Treasury issued the bond with the Central Bank of Kenya.
  • The Capital Markets Authority provided regulatory oversite.
  • The Central Depository and Settlement Corporation (CDSC) of Kenya manages the register of bond holders with delegated authority from the Central Bank of Kenya as well as the periodic coupon payments and redemption.
  • The Kenya Association of Stockbrokers and Investment Banks (KASIB) and its members facilitated the market in the background as accounts were assigned to brokers for purchases and sales.
  • Safaricom’s M-Pesa and Airtel Money integrated their USSD channels (*889#) and payments functionality to the M-Akiba platform to enable customers to open accounts, purchase bonds and receive the semi-annual payments. The per transaction limit was KShs 70,000 (about $700) with the daily limit twice that.
  • After the pilot, PesaLink, the interbank real-time push payment platform, was also integrated into M-Akiba which enabled retail customers to purchase amounts up to KShs 999,999 (about $10,000) per transaction.
  • The Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) facilitates the on-line trading of the bonds through its system and also provides customer service support through a helpline.
  • Through a competitive bid process, Commercial Bank of Africa was selected as a market maker to guarantee purchases sold on the secondary market.

Although there was a lot of excitement and interest when the bond was piloted and launched, the number of retail customers purchasing bonds proved to be low. The bond was first offered in a KShs 150 million pilot phase in March 2017 for a period of three weeks.  Although 102,632 people registered for on the M-Akiba platform, only 5,692 investors purchased M-Akiba before the pilot was sold out implying much higher average purchases than the minimum.  If the initial customers had only bought at the minimum rate, 50,000 customers could have purchased, almost ten times as many as did.

M-Akiba was officially launched on 30 June 2017 (the last day of the government’s fiscal year), to much fanfare and great hopes that the KShs 1 billion on offer would also sell out and even allowed for an initial KShs 3.8 billion to be sold. Over 300,000 people registered on the M-Akiba platform but onl88 purchased M-Akiba bonds during the official launch totaling KShs 247.75 million, only about a quarter of the KShs 1 billion on offer. This even included an extended time period to allow for some of the complications caused by the election period.

Most of those who invested in the bond had higher education (with 59% having gone to university), 61% were formally employed, most had regular income (71% received salary or other regular monthly income) and most were urban (51% were from the capital Nairobi). Women made up 36.8% of those who invested. However, women were much more likely to actually buy the bond after registration.

Given the potential of this concept paired with the low uptake, FSD Africa commissioned BFA to undertake a post-issuance survey to understand the reasons for the unexpectedly low uptake and draw lessons that would be used to improve the product and support the replication of the concept in other markets. For instance, FSD Uganda is currently supporting Bank of Uganda in the development of a concept for distributing government securities to the mass market leveraging on mobile technology.

Although investment did not meet expectations, the post issuance study found that the product was fairly successful in bringing a new broad-based retail investor group into the market for government paper: 85% of customers had never bought a bond before and buyers were distributed across virtually all of Kenya’s 47 counties.  Most of the investors (84%) really liked the product and were likely to recommend it to someone else and 80% of those who invested were likely to invest again, if the product was issued today.

However, the study discovered a range of problems that hindered uptake:

  1. Poor timing – in the two years between the soft launch and product launch, deposit regulations changed, forcing banks to increase interest rates paid on savings from 0% to 7%, thereby diminishing the advantages of the bond. Furthermore, the bond launch coincided with nl elections, so media advertising about the product was swamped by election coverage.
  2. Poor understanding of product – those who registered but did not ultimately purchase the bond were less likely to know the interest rate, tenor, closing date, or other details about the product. That said, understanding was also poor among those who eventually bought the product: less than 2% knew to call the Nairobi Securities Exchange if they needed their money.
  3. Confusing purchase process – while registration was simple, the second stage of the process was confusing and gave no clear, immediate instruction for how to complete the purchase. Moreover, screenshot displays were sometimes misleading and/or confusing so individuals may not have realised their purchase was not complete after registration.
  4. Lack of prompts/reminders- over 60% of individuals interviewed did not receive a single reminder message after registering; and 70% of those who registered but didn’t purchase did not know he investment round was closing.
  5. Agents focused on registration – when agents visited offices, markets, and groups, there was a marked uptake in registrations. However, the agents did not encourage people to actually invest after registering. In addition, it was difficult for customers to get help from agents when they had follow-up questions after registration.
  6. Weak customer care practices – the only helpline available to customers, many of whom did not fully understand the product, was a landline, which was difficult to access and confusing, given the mobile nature of the product. Furthermore, when fraudulent messages circulated about the product, there was no easily accessible customer service available to refute them.
  7. Concerns about minimum investment – some customers felt the KSh 3,000 minimum investment would be better allocated to savings groups or trading opportunities that could provide quick returns or access to credit.

Despite not living up to its oitions, M-Akiba still stands as the first mobile treasury instrument to be sold in Africa. Although the first pilot and launch did not achieve desired outcome, there are significant opportunities to enhance the product in Kenya and replicate elsewhere drawing on the lessons and recommendations made from the post-issuance study and the lessons learned by the implementers to make it more relevant to the daily reality of citizens aiming to invest in their futures.

The growth of m-shwari in Kenya – a market development story

M-Shwari (meaning ‘calm’ in Kiswahili) is a combined savings and loans product launched through a collabo­ration between the Commercial Bank of Africa (CBA) and Safaricom. The M-Shwari account is issued by CBA but must be linked to an M-Pesa mobile money account provided by Safaricom. The only way to deposit into, or withdraw from, M-Shwari is via the M-Pesa wallet.

M-Shwari aims to deepen and diversify the consump­tion and income benefits of M-Pesa by providing clients with a facility to save and by offering credit beyond a user’s networks of family and friends. Surveys of M-Shwari users confirm that they mainly save and borrow to man­age fluctuations in their cash flow and to cope with unex­pected needs.

M-Shwari was launched in January 2013 and by the end of 2014 it boasted 9.2 million sav­ings accounts (representing 7.2 million individual cus­tomers) and had disbursed 20.6 million in loans to 2.8 million borrowers. In 2013, only 19% of M-Shwari users were below the national pov­erty line; tased to 30% by the end of 2014. It can be expected that the proportion of poorer users will grow over time, as usage amongst higher income groups approaches saturation.

The key point is that as a result of M-Shwari, millions of poor Kenyans now use savings and credit services that help them manage risks, mitigate the impact of shocks and, increasingly, invest in improving their livelihoods. M-Shwari was launched in November 2012, yet its scale means it has already changed the nature of the market, and is serving as a platform for the development of innovative new products.

FSD Kenya was instrumental in bringing M-shwari to the market in Kenya. It’s approach was one of using analysis to determine actions, in particular understanding the demand side of the financial sector – the ‘poor and the money’. FSD Kenya also encouraged a first principles approach to product development (i.e. seeking to understand poor clients and then design a product that responds specifically to their needs). From this wider evelopment perspective, the sheer scale and seemingly unabated continued growth of M-Shwari and competitor products has changed the landscape of digital finance services in Kenya.

Financial service providers ought to focus on the cusp group

Posted on by TIMOTHYRADIER

Central Bank Governor Dr Patrick Njoroge fielded some tough questions from the audience on 9th February 2017 at FSD Kenya’s annual financial inclusion lecture. British economist, Professor John Kay, had just delivered a provocative talk on the risks of financialization in the economy. He cautioned Kenyan bankers and policymakers to avoid the mistakes of the Anglo-American finance model and work towards building a financial sector with local solutions that deliver real value for real people.

The point was not lost on the Governor. In the question and answer session, he was grilled on the future of finance in Kenya and how the CBK would ensure access to services that delivered real value to consumers.  In his response, the Governor singled out the financial needs of “cuspers,” getting by on about $2-5 per day.

This market segment, now includes about 12.6 million Kenyans.  These are not the poor, on the brink of survival.  But nor have they achieved firm footing in the middle class – they live “on the cusp”.  The sheer size of this group means we must pay it attention. Cuspers affect the economic lie classes in innumerable ways. The future of this segment will be affected by changes in the financial sector more than any other.

Providing cuspers with helpful financial tools to smooth the volatility in their incomes and build enduring assets will be key to ensuring that Kenya develops a bigger and more inclusive middle class and benefits from the economic and social gains that such a transformation entails.

But such transformation is not automatic.  In our own research on this market segment, we found that the vulnerabilities of the cusp group mean they could end up simply churning within this low-level income band without ever building real capital or income security. We find that cuspers are very much exposed to macro-level shocks and often lack the tools to manage micro-level ones without major financial setbacks.

We also find that credit can be an important tool for upward mobility, and Kenya’s digital credit revolution is opening up those possibilities more rapidly than anyone could have expecteven three years ago. The question today is whether the financial sector is being driven by short-term profits or taking the long term view of sustainable profits by prioritizing cusper client welfare. We have to ask ourselves – how useful is M-Shwari or Branch or Tala to the asset-building ambitions of the cusp group?

“Good credit” for the cusp group happens when borrowers are not overwhelmed with options, they have a plan for the use of capital, have practiced borrowing, understand their debt service obligations, and select from a diversity of credit offerings to fit the right borrowing need. Most importantly, good credit unlocks a pathway towards real assets like land, housing, businesses, and higher education.

I am pleased to hear that the Governor is thinking and talking about those living on the cusp. The question is, are bankers list

Formalising informality: savings groups, community finance and the role of FSD Kenya

Financial inclusion has increased significantly in Kenya. During the main period of FSD Kenya’s work with savings groups, the proportion of adults using different forms of financial services increased from 41.3% in 2009 to 66.7% in 2013; a trend that continues and stands at 75.3% in 2016.

Whilst impressive, this growth has been largely restricted to payments services. More than one-third of Kenyans – more than 5 million people – continue to rely on informal sources of savings and credit. These are usually group schemes, which help families cope with short term risk and invest in their longer term aspirations. Informal group schemes are particularly relevant to women and people in rural areas.

Savings groups are self-selected groups, with up to fifty people who pool their money in a loan fund from which members can borrow. The groups are independent and self-managed; all transactions being carried out at meetings in front of all members to ensure transparency. Savings groups require formation and initial capacity building through a structured process of training and support. However, once established, it has typically been expected that most will continue to function independently, and additionally stimulate some degree of copying by others.

A considerable amount of evidence emerging from several countries, including Kenya, prompted FSD Kenya to support savings groups. This evidence showed that sustainability of formed and trained groups was encouraging (i.e. they continued to reform after shareout), as were signs of copying (i.e. new groups being established).

A key question that FSD Kenya sought to answer was the “extent to which SG programmes are increasing financial inclusion, by bringing one basic service to people who previously had none, or enriching financial inclusion, by bringing an additional service to people who may also use mobile transfer services or a SACCO, or a bank account.

The higher percentage of informal usage among SG members, compared to non-members, coupled with the lower percentage of exclusion among SG members, strongly suggests that the SGs brought financial services to significant numbers of people who previously had none. SGs may also have a financial literacy effect inducing members to use other services”